TEHRAN -- The prospect of a trilateral meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen has revived an uncomfortable historical analogy: Yalta. 
The 1945 conference remains a powerful symbol of how great powers can negotiate the fate of other nations, sometimes without their participation or consent. 
For Iran, the question is not simply whether its name will appear on the agenda of such a meeting, but whether its national interests will be respected in any emerging geopolitical arrangement.
Iran should approach this prospect with neither apprehension nor complacency. The Islamic Republic is not the Iran of decades past, nor is it a country whose regional and international position can be determined through a private understanding among three world leaders. 
The geopolitical realities of 2026 are fundamentally different from those of 1945. Iran has developed significant political, strategic, military, economic and technological capabilities and has become an actor whose interests and calculations cannot be excluded from any serious discussion about the future of West Asia.

The inclusion of Iran on the agenda of a meeting between Washington, Moscow and Beijing is, in itself, an indication of the country’s geopolitical significance. Yet being discussed by major powers is not the same as having one’s interests represented. 
Tehran must make clear that it is not a passive subject of international negotiations, nor a bargaining chip in a broader settlement involving Ukraine, West Asia, nuclear security or the competing ambitions of the three powers.
Iran maintains distinct and consequential relationships with all three countries. Its partnership with Russia has strategic and security dimensions, while its relationship with China is underpinned by important economic and energy interests. 
Relations with the United States, meanwhile, remain defined by profound disagreements, sanctions and unresolved security concerns. These relationships give Iran both opportunities and constraints, but they also demonstrate why no external power can legitimately claim to speak on Tehran’s behalf.
The interests of Moscow and Beijing cannot automatically be equated with those of Tehran. Russia may seek accommodation with Washington over Ukraine or European security. China may prioritize energy security, commercial stability and the prevention of a wider regional conflict. 
The United States may seek arrangements that advance its own security objectives and influence in West Asia. None of these calculations necessarily guarantees the protection of Iran’s interests.
This is precisely where the Yalta analogy becomes relevant. The danger is not necessarily that a secret agreement to divide territories will emerge from Shenzhen. Rather, it is that the major powers may seek to manage regional conflicts through understandings that overlook the sovereignty, security requirements and legitimate interests of the countries directly concerned.
Iran must therefore establish a clear principle: any arrangement concerning the country or its immediate strategic environment must take its full national interests into account. 
These include respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology, legitimate security requirements, economic development, access to international markets, energy interests and the country’s regional role. Its security cannot be treated as a variable to be adjusted in negotiations between others.
This does not mean rejecting diplomacy or assuming that every disagreement must become a confrontation. On the contrary, Iran should remain open to constructive engagement. 
But diplomacy must be based on reciprocity, mutual respect and recognition of national interests. 
Tehran should also recognize that the changing international balance of power creates opportunities as well as risks. The emergence of a more multipolar international system has reduced the ability of any single power or coalition to dictate outcomes everywhere. 
Iran’s strategic position, regional relationships, energy significance and accumulated national capabilities provide it with leverage that must be used intelligently and responsibly.
At the same time, national strength must be translated into diplomatic effectiveness. A credible negotiating position requires economic resilience, technological progress, domestic cohesion and a coherent foreign policy. The stronger these foundations, the harder it becomes for others to formulate arrangements that disregard Iran’s position.
Ultimately, the central issue is not whether Shenzhen will become another Yalta. The world of today is too complex, and the distribution of power too different, for history to repeat itself in precisely the same way. 
The real question is whether the emerging international order will recognize Iran as a consequential and independent actor or continue to treat it as an issue to be managed by others.
Iran must leave any future diplomatic arrangement with its national interests protected, its sovereignty respected and its legitimate rights recognized. 
It must emerge with laurels, not with obligations imposed by others; with meaningful guarantees, not merely political assurances; and with a place in shaping decisions that affect its future.
Anything less would not represent a durable agreement. It would be an arrangement built on an incomplete understanding of the realities of the region and the position Iran now occupies within it. 
And an agreement that ignores the interests of a country whose cooperation and consent are essential to its implementation is unlikely to produce lasting stability.
The message from Tehran should therefore be unmistakable: Iran is prepared to be part of a new regional and international equation, but it will not be reduced to a variable in somebody else’s calculations. 
Any agreement about Iran must be an agreement that takes Iran’s interests fully into account, recognizing that Iran itself is a power to be reckoned with, as it has demonstrated to the world over the past nine months—a reality that China, Russia and the United States understand well. Otherwise, it will have little prospect of success.