TEHRAN -- Starlink, the satellite internet service operated by SpaceX, should be viewed as an instrument of digital imperialism rather than a neutral communications technology, according to an Iranian official who cited its military applications, cross-border operations and role in geopolitical interventions.
Javad Azadi Ahmadabadi, adviser to the secretary of Iran’s Supreme Council of Cyberspace and director general of the presidency office at the National Cyberspace Center, said that Starlink poses challenges to national sovereignty and digital governance because it operates beyond the direct regulatory control of national authorities.
According to Ahmadabadi, Starlink’s constellation of low-Earth-orbit satellites provides global coverage and latency comparable to terrestrial internet services.
However, he said that its architecture allows data traffic to bypass domestic telecommunications infrastructure and operate outside the direct supervision of national governments.
Ahmadabadi cited the war in Ukraine as an example of the strategic implications of satellite internet. Following the outbreak of war with Russia in February 2022, Ukraine sought Starlink services to maintain communications.
Ahmadabadi touched on reports that Elon Musk restricted connectivity during a Ukrainian operation near Crimea, stating that decisions by a private company executive could influence military operations.
He cited reports that Russian forces had obtained Starlink terminals through illicit channels and used them in military operations against Ukraine. These examples,
Ahmadabadi said, demonstrate the dual-use nature of the technology and the risks associated with dependence on infrastructure controlled by a foreign private company.
In Iran, Starlink has been treated as a security issue because of its operation outside the country’s regulatory framework and its use as an alternative communications channel during periods of riots.
Iranian authorities have criminalized the use of unauthorized satellite internet equipment and pursued the issue through formal communications with the International Telecommunication Union and other relevant international bodies.
Ahmadabadi pointed to statements of support for Starlink by Israeli officials, describing them as evidence of the service’s geopolitical significance.
He cited the company’s January 2026 announcement offering free high-speed internet services in Venezuela following U.S. invasion and the abduction of President Nicolás Maduro, presenting the move as another example of satellite connectivity becoming a geopolitical instrument.
He referred to discussions at the United Nations Security Council in December 2025, where Chinese and Russian representatives raised concerns about Starlink’s implications for national sovereignty.
He also highlighted a proposal submitted by Iran and Russia for the 2027 World Radiocommunication Conference, known as WRC-27, which seeks to give countries greater authority to require satellite operators to suspend services within their territories.
Ahmadabadi further linked SpaceX’s commercial activities to U.S. national security interests, citing its Starshield program, which provides satellite-based services for U.S. government and arms customers, as well as a reported agreement with the National Reconnaissance Office.
Addressing reports that Starlink had become free for Iranian users, Ahmadabadi warned that applications advertised as providing free or direct access to the service could be fraudulent and designed to steal personal, financial and banking information. He said Iran’s Cyber Police has repeatedly warned about fake Starlink advertisements.
He said that technical restrictions alone would not provide an effective response, citing the so-called Streisand effect, whereby attempts to suppress information can increase public attention and encourage black-market activity.
Instead, Ahmadabadi proposed a three-part approach: targeted technical restrictions within the law, legal action against smuggling networks and those cooperating with hostile actors, and stronger domestic digital infrastructure and platforms.
He said that digital sovereignty and citizens’ digital rights must be addressed together, adding that effective governance requires both protection against external interference and public trust in domestic services.