TEHRAN – During the recent U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, Kurdish terrorist groups stationed along Iran’s western borders refrained from launching ground attacks against the Islamic Republic—a calculated decision rooted in their profound weakness, Iran’s formidable military capabilities, and a deep-seated distrust of American promises.
Throughout the war, President Donald Trump repeatedly claimed that the United States had provided advanced American weapons and substantial financial support to Kurdish groups near Iran’s western borders. Yet he expressed frustration that they failed to take any action against Iran.
In an explosive admission during an Easter Sunday interview with Fox News, Trump revealed that the United States had covertly supplied weapons to rioters in Iran through Kurdish intermediaries weeks before launching military strikes on Iran—even as American diplomats were engaged in talks with Tehran.
“We sent them a lot of guns. We sent them through the Kurds,” Trump said, adding that the arms “never reached their intended recipients” and suggesting that Kurdish groups may have retained the weapons for themselves.
The confession confirmed earlier reports that the CIA had been exploring ways to arm Iranian Kurdish forces. Trump had previously stated on March 5 that it would be “wonderful” if Kurdish forces in Iraq crossed into Iran to attack the government, though he later backtracked, citing concerns about complicating the war.
Kurdish leaders categorically denied Trump’s allegations, insisting they had not received a single weapon from any foreign actor.
Iranian analysts have noted that the terrorist groups are far weaker than previous threats the Islamic Republic has successfully confronted. The terrorist Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO), which launched a ground invasion in July 1988 after Iran’s acceptance of UN Resolution 598, possessed significant manpower and enjoyed direct support from Saddam Hussein’s regime.
By contrast, today’s Kurdish groups lack the organizational structure, human resources, and logistical capabilities necessary for sustained offensive warfare. Analysts have noted that they are “not structured for sustained offensive warfare against a heavily armed state”.
Over the past decades, Iran’s security and military structures have achieved remarkable progress in both capability and experience in confronting terrorist groups. The conditions of the 1980s cannot be compared to today’s reality.
The heavily militarized Iran-Iraq border, pervasive Iranian security presence, and strict security agreements between Tehran and Baghdad make cross-border operations nearly impossible.
The U.S. strategy rested on a fundamentally flawed assumption that Kurdish groups would serve as reliable proxies. Experts have noted that Trump misunderstands the Kurdish political landscape, treating them as a “single, unified proxy force awaiting orders from Washington” when in reality, Kurdish politics is “deeply fragmented” across multiple parties with divergent ideologies.
The idea that these groups could seize Iranian cities was delusional. Kurdish leaders themselves recognized that entering a ground attack without superiority in manpower, logistics, and operational capability would invite devastating retaliation.
Kurdish groups ultimately chose restraint for five key reasons: limited military readiness, vulnerable sanctuary in Iraqi Kurdistan, political fragmentation, historical mistrust of foreign sponsors, and ambiguity in U.S. intentions.
The experience of Kurdish forces in Syria—where U.S. cooperation was followed by fears of abandonment—created widespread skepticism about aligning too closely with Washington.
Most significantly, Iranian Kurdish factions did not present themselves as proxies waiting to be activated. PJAK spokesperson Rivar Abdanan argued that “Kurdish movements should not tie their future to Washington’s regional agenda,” warning that decades of experience had shown how easily external support could disappear once strategic calculations changed.