ADDIS ABABA (Dispatches) -- Ethiopia is deepening its involvement in Sudan’s ongoing conflict, providing support to the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as the paramilitary group seeks to open a new front in Blue Nile State. 
The move comes amid setbacks for the RSF and reflects Ethiopia’s broader ambition to project regional influence, but experts warn it risks overstretching a country already beset by insurgencies.
Reports indicate that Ethiopia is training up to 10,000 RSF fighters near the Sudanese border, roughly 100 kilometers from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). 
Ethiopian and RSF advances have allowed the capture of the strategic town of Deim Mansour, forcing Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) units to divert resources from other fronts. 
A full RSF victory could extend Ethiopia’s influence to Sudan’s border with Egypt, a country also opposed to the GERD, potentially reshaping Nile basin geopolitics.
The Ethiopian government’s intervention follows its historical pattern of leveraging regional conflicts for strategic gains. 
Addis Ababa has long viewed Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan through the lens of territorial and security interests, often aligning with foreign powers to bolster its position. 
With Washington’s support no longer assured and China and Russia unwilling to provide partisan backing, Ethiopia has turned decisively to the UAE. Abu Dhabi, having been expelled from Somalia and losing influence in Eritrea, now relies on Ethiopia to project power via the RSF.
Domestically, Ethiopia faces mounting pressures. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) continues to control much of Tigray, the Fano militia in Amhara has turned against federal authorities, and Oromo insurgents threaten renewed conflict. 
The Ogaden National Liberation Front has warned of attacks on oil facilities, while unrest persists in Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela. Analysts warn that diverting troops and resources to Sudan risks exacerbating Ethiopia’s fragile internal equilibrium.
“The Ethiopian state is playing a high-stakes game,” said a Horn of Africa security analyst. “Success in Sudan could boost Addis Ababa’s regional leverage, but failure—or even prolonged engagement—could destabilize the federation from within.”
Ethiopia’s support for the RSF reflects a calculated partnership: the UAE provides weapons, funding, and political backing, while Ethiopia absorbs the bulk of operational risk. 
The strategic aim is to secure a buffer along the Sudanese frontier, protect the GERD, and extend influence in the Nile basin. Yet the move underscores a familiar dilemma for Ethiopia: projecting power externally while managing deep domestic fractures.
As fighting intensifies in Sudan, Addis Ababa’s gamble highlights the Horn of Africa’s growing volatility, where regional ambitions and internal instability are dangerously intertwined.