BEIRUT (Dispatches) -- Israel intensified attacks in southern Syria last year, exploiting the power vacuum created by the collapse of the Assad government and the rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, which currently governs Damascus. 
These assaults were justified under security and so-called “humanitarian” pretexts, giving Israel a cover to expand its military presence deeper into Syrian territory. 
Shortly afterward, the Israeli regime announced plans to establish a demilitarized buffer zone in southern Syria, claiming the move was intended to protect the Druze community. 
However, observers viewed this as a strategic first step toward linking the occupied Golan Heights with more extensive areas inside Syria, signaling a broader territorial ambition.
Following this, Israeli special forces penetrated deep into Quneitra and western Dara’a, further solidifying Israel’s footprint inside Syrian lands. In December 2024, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a high-profile visit to Israeli troops deployed within Syrian territory. 
The visit underscored Israel’s evolving position, clearly signaling that it now regards parts of southern Syria as effectively under its direct control, rather than merely contested zones or temporary military outposts.
Parallel to these military maneuvers, research centers and analysts began discussing the emergence of the so-called “David Corridor,” a strategic plan rooted in early Zionist ideology but resurfacing in a modern geopolitical context. 
Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism, envisioned a “Greater Israel” stretching from the Nile River in Egypt to the Euphrates River in Iraq. Later, Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion, in the 1960s, advanced the “periphery doctrine,” which sought alliances with minority groups such as Kurds, Druze, and Maronites to weaken the Arab heartland and reshape the Levant in Israel’s favor. The “David Corridor” thus represents a revival of these long-standing expansionist ambitions, now given concrete geopolitical expression.
According to the plan, the corridor would stretch from the occupied Golan Heights through Quneitra and 
Dara’a, across Swaeda to the U.S. Al-Tanf base in eastern Syria, then onward to Deir al-Zawr and areas held by SDF Kurdish militants east of the Euphrates River, and finally link to Iraqi Kurdistan. This geographically narrow but strategically vital land bridge would provide Israel with direct access to northern Syria and Iraq, dramatically altering regional power dynamics.
The plan includes establishing a Druze autonomous entity in Sweida and a Kurdish autonomous region in northeastern Syria. This would amount to an effective partition of Syria, fragmenting Iraq, and destabilizing Turkey. 
Ankara has condemned the corridor strongly. In July 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned of possible military action against Israeli-backed moves and expressed concern over the disruption of Turkey’s traditional trade routes with the Persian Gulf due to this project.
Tensions flared further in mid-2025 in Sweida, where Druze leader Hikmat al-Hijri called for a “humanitarian corridor” toward Kurdish-held areas, a move supported by the U.S.-backed SDF proxies. 
This led to diplomatic efforts, and in August 2025, a meeting held in Paris between U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, Israeli minister of strategic affairs Ron Dermer, and Syria’s HTS foreign minister Asaad al-Shibani resulted in a tentative ceasefire. 
As part of this agreement, local security responsibilities were handed over to Druze forces, and Israel conducted airdrops over Sweida under the cover of humanitarian aid.
However, Jordan refused to allow Israeli aid to transit its territory to Sweida, while HTS authorities opposed the establishment of a direct corridor from the Golan Heights to Sweida. As a result, Washington proposed a compromise: a humanitarian corridor running from Damascus to Sweida, offering a temporary solution amid regional opposition and logistical obstacles.
Israel has never officially confirmed the existence of the “David Corridor” plan. Yet Netanyahu’s August 2025 interview, in which he spoke of a “historic and spiritual mission” tied to the vision of Greater Israel, amounted to an implicit endorsement of the project. Likewise, U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2024 campaign declaration that “Israel is too small and must be expanded” was widely interpreted as supporting Netanyahu’s expansionist agenda.
Despite the apparent momentum, no single power controls the entire proposed route of the corridor. Both Iraq and Jordan firmly reject any border changes, and Turkey remains staunchly opposed to Kurdish expansion or independence. 
Consequently, the “David Corridor” remains largely an Israeli strategic ambition, awaiting shifts in regional power balances before it can be fully realized.
Meanwhile, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which governs Damascus and is closely linked to Al-Qaeda and Daesh-affiliated factions, has taken no meaningful action against Israeli aggression or occupation. 
Instead, HTS has made repeated overtures toward normalization with Israel, further complicating Syria’s fragmented resistance landscape and undermining efforts to present a unified front against Israeli expansionism. 
This complex situation continues to fuel instability in the region and poses ongoing challenges to Syrian sovereignty and regional security.