Pentagon Resorts to Expired Missiles in Terrorist War on Iran
WASHINGTON – The U.S. Navy has resorted to firing expired munitions after reclassifying them for use, while the Pentagon is struggling to replenish its depleted Patriot missile stockpiles because of a shortage of a critical French-made industrial material, exposing mounting weaknesses following months of war against Iran.
The revelations, reported by the Wall Street Journal and acknowledged by Acting U.S. Navy Secretary Hung Cao during his Senate confirmation hearing on Tuesday, highlight the growing difficulties facing Washington as weapons consumption outpaces the capacity of its war industry to replace expended munitions.
Cao told lawmakers that the Navy has reclassified certain expired weapons, allowing them to be fired during military operations.
He also acknowledged the scale of the production challenge, saying the United States has increased Tomahawk cruise missile manufacturing from approximately 125 annually when he was in uniform to more than 60 per month.
However, the increased output has not prevented pressure on existing inventories.
The disclosure comes as the Pentagon faces a separate bottleneck in manufacturing Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors: the limited availability of carbonized rayon, a specialized heat-resistant material essential to the missiles' rocket-motor nozzles.
According to a November 17 Wall Street Journal investigation by Niharika Mandhana, Josh Chin and Drew FitzGerald, the material's production depends heavily on ArianeGroup, a French aerospace company whose limited manufacturing capacity is constraining efforts to increase American missile output.
The material is processed by Kansas-based Park Aerospace before being supplied to L3Harris for use in Patriot missile production. The concentration of production in such a limited supply chain has left the Pentagon dependent on a foreign supplier at a time when demand for interceptors has surged.
Park Aerospace Chief Executive Brian Shore told the newspaper that Washington's pressure would not necessarily persuade the French company to increase production.
"They're a French company. They can't be bullied. They'll just shut down on you," Shore said.
The supply problem comes as American inventories of advanced missile interceptors have fallen sharply during the terrorist war on Iran.
A July 27 assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), titled Renewed Iran War Would Test Diminished Interceptor Inventories, estimated that U.S. Patriot interceptor stocks had fallen from 2,330 before the war to between 759 and 827 following subsequent fighting, representing a reduction of at least 65 percent.
The same assessment placed the remaining THAAD interceptor inventory at approximately 250 missiles, substantially below its prewar level.
The Associated Press also reported that the depletion could force American forces to make difficult decisions about intercepting incoming missiles, potentially accepting greater risks to conserve limited supplies.
Each PAC-3 MSE interceptor costs approximately $4 million and takes around two years to manufacture. Its production involves hundreds of components sourced through an extensive network of specialized suppliers.
The Pentagon has signed a seven-year agreement with Lockheed Martin to increase annual PAC-3 MSE production to approximately 2,000 missiles by the end of 2030. Nevertheless, the target underscores the gap between Washington's immediate replenishment requirements and the time needed to expand manufacturing capacity.
The Wall Street Journal investigation found that the American war industry remains heavily dependent on a relatively small number of suppliers, many of them operating outside the United States.
The carbonized rayon used in Patriot interceptors begins as raw fiber produced in the Czech Republic. It is transported to France, where it is woven into fabric and carbonized by ArianeGroup near Bordeaux. The finished material is then shipped to Park Aerospace in Kansas for further processing before reaching L3Harris.
The Pentagon is attempting to establish alternative sources, but qualifying substitute materials requires extensive testing. A failure during the final stages can force manufacturers to restart the approval process.
Park Aerospace has provided $5 million to ArianeGroup to accelerate a new French production line expected to begin operating in 2028. The companies are also considering a U.S. manufacturing facility, potentially opening around 2030, with Park committing an initial $25 million toward the project.
A German manufacturer, Enka, represents another possible source, but its rayon has not yet been approved for the advanced Patriot interceptor. The company is also facing financial difficulties, with production potentially ending in 2028.
The investigation traced the current vulnerabilities partly to post-Cold War restructuring of the U.S. war industry.
The shortage of interceptors is part of a broader pattern of weapons depletion following the U.S.-Israeli military aggression against Iran, launched in late February 2026.
American forces have expended substantial quantities of air-defense interceptors and precision-strike weapons during the war. Reuters previously reported that U.S. Army inventories of ATACMS and Precision Strike Missile systems had also come under serious pressure.
During Tuesday's Senate hearing, Senator Jack Reed warned that the munitions expended and damage sustained during Operation Epic Fury alone would take years to recover.
The financial costs are also mounting. Acting Navy Secretary Cao confirmed that maintaining the naval blockade against Iranian shipping costs approximately $32.5 million daily, while lawmakers raised concerns about damage to U.S. military facilities in Bahrain.
A Congressional Research Service report published in October also cited estimates that the U.S. military had expended approximately 1,700 Patriot, 200 THAAD and 150 Standard Missile interceptors during the war, underscoring the scale of ammunition consumption.
The developments raise serious questions about Washington's ability to sustain prolonged military adventurism while simultaneously maintaining its military operations elsewhere, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.