From Brookings to Chatham House and the IISS, prominent Western analysts acknowledge that Iran has survived an existential confrontation, emerged with greater strategic leverage and challenged the foundations of America's decades-old security order in West Asia.

TEHRAN – One of the most consequential developments in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran is no longer confined to military operations or diplomatic negotiations. ‘

It is the growing recognition among prominent Western scholars, international think tanks and influential American commentators that the war has fundamentally altered the strategic balance in West Asia, undermined Washington's regional predominance and elevated Iran's position as an indispensable power in determining the future of the region.

Perhaps the most extraordinary assessment has come from Robert Kagan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and one of America's most influential foreign-policy commentators.

Writing in The Atlantic on May 21, Kagan delivered a devastating assessment of Trump's position, describing Washington's emerging strategy as effectively an admission of defeat.

"Endgame in this case is a euphemism for 'surrender'," he wrote, stating that the United States is preparing to walk away from the war without achieving its principal strategic objectives.

Kagan's assessment went further than criticizing Trump's decisions. He warned that the consequences could extend to the foundations of American regional power.

"If Iran controls the strait, that is a defeat for the United States. It's the end of American hegemony in the region," he said in an interview with CNN.

The significance of this statement cannot be overstated. It came from an established American foreign-policy figure, not an Iranian official or a supporter of Tehran.

Kagan also questioned what Washington could realistically accomplish through additional bombardment, stating that the military options would carry enormous costs and might be unacceptable to both Trump and the American public.

An equally important assessment appeared in September in The World Today, published by Chatham House, one of Britain's leading international affairs institutions.

Professor Mohsen Milani of the University of South Florida said that the war could ultimately be remembered for challenging the foundations of Pax Americana in the Persian Gulf.

He wrote that Washington and Tel Aviv had underestimated "the resilience of the Iranian state, the cohesion of its elites and institutions and the nationalist surge a foreign attack would unleash."

This is a particularly revealing observation.

The American and Israeli calculations had assumed that military pressure, economic hardship and attacks against Iran's leadership would produce political fragmentation and ultimately force Tehran into submission.

Instead, according to Milani, Iran demonstrated an ability to withstand the aggression and employ its geographical position to compensate for conventional military disadvantages.

His assessment was unequivocal about the changing regional balance: Iran was positioned to reassert itself as "a pivotal regional power," while American primacy is increasingly being challenged.

Milani also emphasized that the consequences extend beyond Iran itself. Persian Gulf Arab governments are reconsidering their security arrangements, China is positioned to expand its influence, and regional countries are increasingly compelled to reconsider their dependence on Washington.

In other words, the war has called into question not simply America's ability to defeat Iran, but the credibility of the regional security architecture Washington constructed over decades.

Perhaps the most important institutional assessment comes from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), whose October 30 strategic dossier, The Persian Gulf at War, examines the military and geopolitical consequences of the confrontation.

Its chapter, "War and Brinkmanship: The View from Iran," reaches several striking conclusions.

The IISS states that Iran has achieved "strategic effect during the war," increasing its leverage through disruption of the Strait of Hormuz and its attacks on U.S. assets in Persian Gulf states.

It further concludes that Iran has "performed better than expected" in aligning its missile and unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities with its military and political objectives.

The institution's assessment of the war's political outcome is even more significant.

"The Islamic Republic has withstood an existential challenge and appears to have emerged emboldened and more hardline," the report states.

The IISS also states that Tehran is likely to use negotiations and strategic brinkmanship to preserve its leverage and exhaust Washington.

Iran survived the existential challenge, denied Washington its desired political outcome and acquired new bargaining leverage. That distinction represents a serious strategic setback for the United States.

The Brookings Institution's May 21 discussion, Has the U.S. Lost the Iran War?, provides another remarkable indication of the concerns emerging within the American strategic establishment.

Its assessment was blunt: "The United States is in a worse position now than it was before the start of the Iran war."

The discussion highlighted Iran's leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and the enormous military commitment that Washington could face if it attempted to establish control over the waterway.

The implications are particularly serious because Hormuz is not simply an Iranian national security concern. It is a critical international energy corridor.

Iran's ability to influence navigation through this strategic passage gives Tehran leverage that cannot be neutralized merely through declarations of American military superiority.

The war has therefore exposed a fundamental limitation of Washington's approach: military superiority does not automatically guarantee control over strategic geography or the political decisions of another country.

The wider implications are becoming increasingly difficult for Washington to dismiss.

For decades, American regional predominance rested on three interconnected pillars: military bases across the Persian Gulf, security partnerships with Arab monarchies and the assumption that no regional power could seriously challenge Washington's ability to determine the strategic environment.

Milani argues that Persian Gulf governments will increasingly hedge their security relationships, even while maintaining important ties with Washington. The growing interest in alternative security partnerships reflects doubts about whether the American security umbrella can guarantee protection against future regional conflicts.

China, meanwhile, has an opportunity to expand its diplomatic, economic and strategic influence without having to reproduce America's extensive military presence.

The implications reach beyond the Persian Gulf. A regional order in which Washington can no longer dictate outcomes unilaterally would represent a significant transformation in the international distribution of power.

The central lesson of the confrontation is that power cannot be measured exclusively by the number of aircraft carriers, advanced fighter jets or military bases.

It must also be measured by the ability to withstand pressure, preserve political independence, impose strategic costs and prevent a militarily superior adversary from achieving its objectives.

This is where Iran's performance has attracted attention among international analysts.

The country's geographical position, missile capabilities, asymmetric military options, regional relationships and demonstrated willingness to endure prolonged confrontation have complicated Washington's calculations.

The resulting transformation could have consequences for decades.

For the United States, the danger is that its regional allies may increasingly question the reliability of American protection, while its adversaries draw lessons from the limits of military coercion.

For Iran, the opportunity is to translate its wartime strategic leverage into durable diplomatic, economic and security arrangements, while avoiding overreach and rebuilding the capabilities damaged during the conflict.

The emerging picture is therefore not simply one of an American president suffering a political setback. It is a challenge to the strategic assumptions that have governed Washington's relationship with West Asia for generations.

The United States may retain enormous global power, but its ability to dictate the future of West Asia is increasingly contested.

And perhaps the most significant development of this confrontation is that the argument is no longer being made only in Tehran. It is increasingly being acknowledged in the offices, research centers and publications of the Western strategic establishment itself.