WASHINGTON (Dispatches) -- The United States expended approximately a quarter of its advanced THAAD missile interceptor arsenal during the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June, exposing serious weaknesses in the U.S. missile defense infrastructure and raising new doubts about its ability to sustain a prolonged military confrontation, according to American media reports.
Citing sources close to the operation, CNN reported that U.S. forces fired over 100—possibly up to 150—THAAD interceptors in an attempt to counter Iran’s unprecedented barrage of long-range ballistic missiles, launched in direct retaliation for Israeli strikes deep inside Iranian territory. 
Two of the U.S.’s seven THAAD batteries were deployed to the Israeli occupied territories during the operation, highlighting its dependency on limited and costly systems to manage real-time threats.
Each THAAD interceptor costs roughly $12.7 million, and the U.S. was only able to procure 11 new units last year, with just 12 more expected this fiscal year. American defense analysts and former Pentagon officials expressed alarm over how quickly the U.S. stockpile was depleted, particularly at a time when the country faces increasing strategic competition with China and rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific.
Despite the heavy use of THAAD systems, dozens of Iranian ballistic missiles successfully penetrated Israel’s layered air defenses, including those managed jointly by Israeli and U.S. forces. 
Major cities such as Tel Aviv were struck, military installations were damaged, and infrastructure—including parts of the power grid—was knocked offline. Israeli authorities confirmed at least 29 casualties, while economic damages are expected to exceed $1.8 billion, with figures still rising.
While Israeli and U.S. officials claimed a high interception rate—reportedly 86%—Iran’s missile strike capabilities appeared to intensify over the course of the war. 
Analysts from the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) confirmed that Iran launched over 500 long-range missiles, with at least 57 striking targets. 
According to their assessment, the THAAD system was responsible for nearly half of the allegedly successful interceptions, revealing both the extent of American involvement and the insufficiency of Israel’s own Arrow-3 and Arrow-2 interceptors in dealing with a sustained and coordinated missile campaign.
A growing number of U.S. military and security experts are sounding the alarm about what they describe as “unsustainable” usage rates of advanced interceptors. 
“This is not the kind of thing the U.S. can afford to keep doing,” one expert told CNN. “Missile defense interceptor capacity is a real concern, and THAAD is a scarce and limited resource.”
Even more concerning for American strategic planners is the pace of replenishment. Based on current production levels, experts estimate that it will take the U.S. up to eight years to restore its interceptor stockpile to pre-war levels. The Pentagon is reportedly planning to invest billions in increasing munitions production and upgrading supply chains, but critics argue that these steps are coming too late.
Meanwhile, Iran’s success in breaching even the most advanced U.S.-backed missile defense systems has shifted perceptions of regional power dynamics. 
Observers note that Tehran used increasingly sophisticated weapons during the war, including missiles equipped with multiple warheads and decoys designed to overwhelm enemy radar. These tactics proved effective, particularly in the latter days of the war when the interception rate dropped significantly—down to just 75% on the final day before the ceasefire.
Commentators also pointed out that Israel may have been forced to prioritize limited interceptor resources as the war dragged on, allowing some missiles to land in urban areas while preserving defenses for more critical installations. This scenario further revealed Israel’s dependency on U.S. protection and its inability to independently manage a prolonged missile confrontation.
Some American defense officials are now warning that this depletion of missile resources could jeopardize U.S. readiness elsewhere, particularly in the Pacific. 
“Stockpiles are dropping. We need more. We need them faster than they are being built,” said a former senior Pentagon official, expressing concern that the U.S. may be overextending itself by investing so heavily in Middle Eastern conflicts at the expense of deterrence capabilities in Asia.
Ultimately, the 12-day confrontation has not only exposed significant gaps in Western missile defense architecture, but also highlighted Iran’s growing strategic depth and ability to challenge regional military equations. 
Despite the combined might of U.S. and Israeli systems, Iran’s missile forces demonstrated operational resilience and technological sophistication, shifting the narrative on deterrence and the balance of power in West Asia.