TEHRAN – The new Syrian administration led by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, head of the former terrorist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is reportedly seeking normalization of relations with Israel in what observers describe as an effort to secure its political survival and international legitimacy. However, the regime faces significant domestic and geopolitical obstacles that could derail the process.
Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government, Syria has descended into deeper fragmentation and military disarray. The Israeli military, which has carried out near-daily airstrikes across Syria in recent years, now operates with near impunity, with Tel Aviv no longer viewing Syria as a credible military threat. This strategic shift has emboldened Israeli leadership to reject any substantial concessions in potential normalization talks.
Despite this, Jolani’s interim administration appears to regard normalization with Israel as a pathway to remove international sanctions, improve its global image, and reinforce its shaky hold on power. Diplomatic sources say indirect talks, facilitated by Arab and European intermediaries, have been ongoing since early 2025.
A core issue driving the normalization push is the Syrian government’s weak military capacity. After more than a decade of conflict and recent Israeli strikes, Damascus is effectively disarmed. Israel, citing alleged threats to the Druze minority in southern Syria from Jolani’s former affiliates, has escalated airstrikes in the capital and surrounding areas, including targeting the Syrian army’s General Staff headquarters.
Analysts note that Tel Aviv, buoyed by its current position of strength, is unlikely to offer any tangible gains to Damascus in exchange
 for recognition or peace. “Israel does not see any reason to provide concessions to a government it views as both weak and dependent,” said one Middle East analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Jolani’s government, formerly classified as a terrorist organization by the U.S., seeks to rebrand itself as a moderate partner. By aligning with Israel, it hopes to shed its extremist image and appeal to Western nations. Yet, the cost of this pivot could be politically explosive within Syria.
Several internal dynamics threaten to derail normalization efforts. Chief among them is the lack of domestic legitimacy. Jolani’s government is a product of wartime alliances between various armed factions and regional backers, rather than a nationally unified or elected body. Its political base is fractured, and opposition remains strong in many areas.
Further complicating matters is the near-total erosion of centralized governance. Syria today is not a unified state in the traditional sense, but a patchwork of factions, each with varying loyalties. Any move toward normalization with Israel—particularly without clear concessions such as the return of the Golan Heights or recognition of Palestinian rights—could ignite serious unrest.
Public sentiment remains a potent barrier. Although official Arab rhetoric on Palestine has declined in recent years, large segments of the Syrian and broader Arab public continue to view Israel as an occupying force. “Without tangible gains, any deal with Israel would be seen as a betrayal by the Syrian people,” said a regional commentator based in Beirut.
The potential fallout could damage Jolani’s already fragile government, alienating key backers and sparking protests or even renewed conflict in areas where anti-Israel sentiment remains high.
Jolani’s recent trip to Azerbaijan on July 12 is seen as part of broader efforts to gain international acceptance. Observers speculate that regional actors such as Turkey and Persian Gulf states are playing behind-the-scenes roles in facilitating contacts between Damascus and Tel Aviv.
Meanwhile, U.S. officials, including former President Donald Trump and his envoys, have expressed support for an expanded normalization agenda in the region. Reports suggest the U.S. views a Syrian-Israeli agreement as a potential foreign policy win, especially if it leads to the removal of sanctions and the containment of Iranian influence.
Despite these pressures, the road ahead remains uncertain. The convergence of military weakness, political fragmentation, and public opposition makes normalization a high-risk gamble for the Jolani-led administration. For now, any breakthrough will likely depend on whether external incentives can outweigh the domestic costs.