BEIRUT (Dispatches) -- The
initial optimism of the West and its allies that followed the fall of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s government has swiftly turned into a nightmare.
The so-called ‘inclusive leadership’ of Abu Mohammad al-Julani, described as ‘president’ by former Al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and allied militant factions, was dramatically debunked last week after the rampant massacre of Syrian Alawites by his cadres.
Noticeably, the HTS administration in Damascus is not directing its efforts against Israeli occupation forces just 20 kilometers from the capital, nor against the Druze in the south, nor even against the U.S.-backed SDF Kurdish militants in the country’s northeast.
Instead, its most keen target is Syria’s Alawite minority community, which faces abductions – sometimes in batches of five or 10 per day – executions, home invasions, and even forced humiliation, such as being ordered to bark like dogs.
While the Julani regime claims its killing operations target “remnants of the old regime,” the military crackdown on Alawites that started in early March quickly descended into open massacres of civilians. According to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), at least 973 Alawite civilians were slaughtered on March 10 alone.
The HTS-linked regime justifies its actions as necessary measures against “armed violence by regime remnants.” Yet, the definition and scope of these so-called ‘remnants’ remain ambiguous and, on closer scrutiny, fall apart entirely.
On March 4, it was announced that “two members of the Syrian Defense Ministry were killed in an armed ambush” in the Alawite neighborhood of Datur in the coastal province of Latakia. The following day, HTS forces stormed the area in military vehicles and opened fire at random, accompanied by shouts of “Alawite pigs, we will crush your heads.” Four civilians, two construction workers, and two school guards were killed in the melee. Footage of the attack was broadcast worldwide.
The violence rapidly spread across Syria’s coastal region on March 6. In Daliyah, an Alawite village near Jableh in Tartous province, HTS forces attempted to detain a 20-year-old man for questioning – despite the fact that he had never served in the Syrian army. Local leaders, wary of previous ‘questionings’ that had ended in executions, offered to mediate his surrender. Their offer was rejected.
The young man was forcibly taken, but the HTS forces were ambushed on their way out, leaving 13 of them dead. In retaliation, the HTS regime launched an indiscriminate aerial and artillery bombardment of Alawite villages.
Mass protests then erupted in Tartous province – home to Russia’s naval base. Demonstrators stormed the governor’s office, and a video surfaced showing a Russian warplane maneuvering to force HTS helicopters to land.
The regime responded with reinforcements, while the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) deployed from the north. As HTS security forces opened fire on demonstrators, alarming reports of massacres of Alawites began to surface.
Amidst the turmoil, an Alawite militant group called the ‘Coastal Shield Brigade’ declared an armed uprising, announcing the formation of the ‘Military Council for the Liberation of Syria.’ Damascus imposed a curfew in Tartous and Latakia, launching a sweeping military campaign. Reports indicate significant losses among HTS security forces as insurgent groups retreated into the mountainous terrain.
Meanwhile, factions aligned with the Julani regime took to social media, openly calling for “jihad against the Alawites.” Mosques in HTS-stronghold Idlib and Hama amplified this message to their congregations, inciting sectarian strife.
Some Alawite civilians reportedly fled to mountainous areas, while others sought refuge with trusted Sunni acquaintances. Nearly 2,000 Alawites have taken refuge at Russia’s Hmeimim Air Base, and thousands have crossed the border into Lebanon. Alexander Yuryevich, the commander of Russia’s bases in Syria, warned HTS forces, “If you attack our bases, you will be reduced to ashes.”
The fate of civilians who did not manage to escape the massacre is unknown. In Al-Qusour, the Alawite neighborhood of Banyas, anyone unable to escape was reportedly killed. Syrian journalist Hala Mansour announced on her social media account that her aunt was killed in Al-Qusour along with her husband and two children.
Mansour is a dentist – her husband was a doctor, her older son a pharmacist, and her younger son a 10th-grade student. The head of the family had reportedly mediated between the opposition and HTS authorities on numerous occasions.
Hanadi Zahlout, an anti-Assad Alawite, also announced on social media that her three brothers had been killed. Another Alawite opponent of Assad, Dr Abdellatif Ali, who served three years in prison, was also killed along with his wife and child. These are just among the first trickle of confirmed horror stories emerging from the scene of the massacre.
Videos taken by HTS forces themselves show smoke billowing from Alawite neighborhoods and villages as they are looted and burned to the sound of laughter and insults: ordinary families, old and young, slaughtered in their homes and gardens; bloodied bodies of men lying side by side in the streets or stuffed into pickup trucks and stomped on; and countless videos of unarmed civilians executed individually or en masse.
Journalist Sarkis Kassargian published images of mass graves, reportedly dug by HTS forces to conceal their atrocities. In response to international scrutiny, HTS minister of defense, Murhaf Abu Kasra, abruptly banned the filming of operations.
Despite the outcry, the first international support for the HTS regime came from Saudi Arabia – Julani’s birthplace and his first foreign stop after assuming Syria’s presidency. The Saudi Foreign Ministry’s statement on March 7 condemned the “crimes committed by outlawed groups” and pledged support for Damascus’s efforts to “restore security and stability and maintain internal peace.”
Ankara followed suit. On March 9, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, speaking at a security summit alongside his counterparts from Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, framed the crisis as a “provocation” and urged Syria’s Alawite, Christian, and Druze minorities to “avoid escalation.” Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Arab League all issued statements essentially backing the HTS-led regime.
Facing global condemnation, Julani is now attempting to backtrack. While he initially called on Alawites to “lay down their arms and surrender” while praising HTS murderers for their “restraint,” global criticism pushed him to announce the formation of a “committee to investigate the coastal incidents” and a “committee in charge of communicating with the coastal population.”
It is doubtful how far these announcements and platitudes will appease Syria’s Alawites, who have just emerged from an unimaginable slaughter. After all, the perpetrators of sectarian crimes have not been held to account before by the extremist forces now settled in Damascus.
One of Julani’s most glaring contradictions is the growing influence of takfiri terrorists – Chechens, Uighurs, Albanians, and Uzbeks – who were granted Syrian citizenship and military ranks for their “contributions to the revolution.”
Kassargian notes contradictions in the statements of Julani who has adopted his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa since the Damascus capture.
“Sharaa claims all militants have joined the Syrian army, except the Kurds and Druze. Yet, he also admits that the massacres were carried out by his own security forces. The most optimistic scenario is that factions within his own defense ministry are acting independently.”
The Alawite massacres now set a dangerous precedent for the SDF in the northeast and armed Druze groups in the south – both of whom Julani seeks to integrate under a single military umbrella.
Noting that the Kurds had experienced similar massacres in Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, and the Druze in Idlib – both at the hands of foreign-backed extremists – Kassargian believes that “Sharaa will have a very difficult time unifying Syria” because none of these groups trust him and his cadres.
Syrian-born journalist and writer Husnu Mahalli emphasizes that the Western media narrative currently parroting the HTS regime’s claims to be facing ‘an armed rebellion of regime remnants’ is largely false.
Mahalli reminds that there are more than 15,000 foreign Salafi extremists under Julani’s administration.
“These include Chechens, Uighurs, Albanians, Tunisians, Egyptians, Jordanians, Germans, French jihadis ... Sharaa’s government has authorized these foreigners. The police chiefs they appointed in Latakia and its surroundings are Uzbek, Tajik and Albanian. How can it work with them running the law?”
Mahalli noted that last week, the HTS ministry of religious affairs replaced all moderate preachers and imams with radical imams, warning that “if [the HTS regime] had any intention of ensuring Syria’s unity, they would not have done this.”
Last week’s HTS massacres have, in any case, fully exposed the sectarian hatred at the heart of the HTS regime’s new leaders. Sectarianism is the biggest threat to Syrian unity, bar none. There are foreign and domestic parties that actively seek to fan these flames and fragment Syria, while others want the exact opposite.
According to Gulriz Ergoz, in an article published in The Cradle, the mass murder of hundreds of Alawites has done one sure thing – it has brought the issue to the fore and, over the next weeks and months, will expose the parties who seek Syria’s division.